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Arnold: The Changing Law of Competition in Public Service--A Dissent
EDITORIAL NOTES

There is too much danger from injunctions like that in the
Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Company Case that in this vast
struggle of forces lying beneath social unrest the power of
the state can justly be said to have been thrown on the side
of capital.
-CLIFFORD

R.

SNIDER.

THE CHANGING LAW OF COMPETITION IN PUBLIC SERVICEA DISSENT.-The principles outlined by Mr. Hardman in his
very able article in this issue of the West Virginia Law
Quarterly, and in his former article under the same title
in the last volume of this Quarterly have attracted interest
which is not confined to this state. Mr. Hardman is among
the first to analyze the decisions illustrating what he terms a
new judicial legal principle, i.e., a principle of regulated
monopoly in public service with a view to the protection of
existing public utilities against ruinous competition. By
this he means that courts should recognize that the paramount intent of the public in having good service at adequate rates is better served by protecting existing utilities
against free competition.
The question of whether there is or whether there should
be such a new legal principle in public utilities law is one
which has attracted wide interest and even anxiety. The
editors of the Quarterly have received letters and inquiries
from various parts of the United States. Companies operating bus lines and companies manufacturing busses are
anxious to know what this new legal principle is and what
its results will be. Such companies have vital economic
interests in the question. They are able to keep in touch
with legislatures and usually have, or at any rate think
they have, an idea of what legislative acts mean. They
also have, or think they have, means of persuading legislatures to repeal acts if they are economically unsound. The
announcement of a new judicial principle dealing with
public utilities however leaves them in a state of perplexed
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anxiety. It lacks the definiteness of an act of the legislature. An act of the legislature is static. Its passage does
not mean that the next legislature is bound to carry its
implications a step further. A judicial principle however
is only a starting point and lawyers disagree just where it
will end. Because they believe that West Virginia is a
leading state in the promulgation of this principle many
have asked for opinions from this law school regarding possible implications of this principle.
Mr. Hardman's second article published in this issue is
in part an attempt to answer some of these questions. He
makes his position clear. He believes that the time has
come for the announcement of a new judicial principle
dealing with public utilities and he supports the conclusions
of the Supreme Court of West Virginia in a number of recent cases, laying down what he terms a changing law of
competition in public service. The change he thinks has
been the recognition by the courts, acting at least to a certain extent independently of particular legislative enactments, that existing public utilities should be protected
against competition on account of the paramount public interest in regulated monopoly as opposed to what he terms
ruinous competition.
We venture to dissent from Mr. Hardman's conclusions
concerning this so-called new judicial principle. We will
not discuss the doubt which has been raised by many as to
whether such a new principle actually exists. Mr. Hardman does not contend that the principle is definitely settled
or its limits defined. Nevertheless it would have to be admitted by anyone who disagreed with Mr. I-ardman's conclusions that he has marshalled considerable judicial support, at least in the language and the reasoning of the
court, for his statement of this principle. However, the
decisions have not gone far enough so that the question as
to the existence of such a principle and its social utility are
not still open to question.
Should a court after a careful examination of the economic situation relating to public utilities lay down a principle involving the protection of regulated monopoly against
ruinous competition in the absence of any specific declaration of the legislature? We think not. In order to do so
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the court must decide two questions. One is economic, the
other is legal. The court must roughly follow the following
syllogism. (1) Protection against ruinous competition is
a sound economic policy relating to public utilities. (2)
The court in its decision should follow the sound economic
policy. Therefore, the court should protect existing public
utilities from competition.
On the first premise of this syllogism we are unable to
register any certain conviction but we do, nevertheless,
privilege ourselves considerable doubt. We distrust generalization in the field of economics. The answer to this
question depends upon too many intangible things and the
conclusion as to its soundness depends upon the point of
view as to the ultimate end to be achieved. Assuming that
such a principle conduces to the public comfort, is the protection of public comfort as opposed to private rights and
freedom the sole object of judicial decision? This is a
question which will never be conclusively determined.
Neither is it at all certain that regulated monopoly is the
best way of maintaining dfficiency. We do not wish to
argue this question but merely to point out that it is one
on which reasonable men would differ.
The minor premise of this syllogism is that the court
should follow economic principles, which seem to them
sound, even to the extent of committing the crime of judicial legislation. Is this sound? It is true as Mr. Hardman
points out that the nature of judicial process is such that
"within its appropriate limits judicial legislation is justifiable." It is further true that "frankness in admitting the
fact that courts do so legislate when justice requires will
prevent much legal stagnation." Anyone can point out
numerous examples of judicial legislation in the past which
have been extremely successfil from a social point of view
and other examples may be found where the timidity of
the courts in taking a step without the legislature's sanction
has resulted in unfortunate social consequences. Admitting
all this, we believe that this new policy against competition in public service advocated by Mr. Hardman implies a
different kind of judicial legislation than has been indulged
in by courts in their more conspicuous attempts at.this hazardous occupation in the past. Let us examine four ex-
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amples which are commonly cited as successful judicial legislation. Courts of equity in violation of the common law
permitted married women to hold for their own benefit
separate estates in equity. English courts recognized the
custom of bankers in dealing witli negotiable paper and
laid the foundation for a new law of negotiable instruments.
Courts in the mining districts in the west announced a completely new system of mining law which followed customs
of miners built up by virtue of the necessity of orderly operation of lode claims. Courts in the arid states of this
country threw -overboard the doctrine of riparian rights in
order to allow the irrigation of crops in a country where
water was a valuable commodity. Other examples could
easily be found but we cite these because they are conspicuous and because each of these attempts at judicial legislation was unquestionably a success. Yet in each -of these
cases the courts were forced into their decisions by conditions which the customs and necessities of society had created for them. They were not trying to give a different
trend to the economic development of the matters affected.
They were recognizing something which had only happened as a'matter of custom. Further in these cases conditions confronted the courts about which reasonable men
could hardly differ. For example, irrigation in the west
was impossible as water in substantial quantities could not
be diverted from streams. The court was fdrced to announce a new rule.
A similar situation does not exist today in the law of public utilities. It is not impossible to carry the public from
place to place without the enunciation of a new doctrine
favoring regulated monopoly against ruinous competition.
We do not have a case where the legislature has failed to
act on a matter of necessity. On the contrary, the legislature has acted under these circumstances. We dissent from
the idea that a court may judicially determine the policy
of the legislature in so acting and then embark on a new
principle, using that policy as a starting point.
We believe that only in cases where two reasonable men
would not differ as to the economic or social necessities of
the new judicial principle, should the court announce one.
We believe that there are certain fundamental reasons in-
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herent in the structure of courts which render it inadvisable
for them to announce economic policies on disputed economic questions. First, they may not act on first hand information, nor may they hire experts of their own, not connected with either side of the case to investigate whether
competition in public utilities is affecting service to the public. No business executive could determine on an economic
policy by avoiding personal contact with the problem and
only hearing it vigorously argued pro and con by persons
who had takeA opposite sides. Conferences of parties interested in an informal manner are difficult, if not impossible, in judicial action. Second, judicial decisions, if
wrong, are more difficult to change than the decisions of
administrative bodies. They must fit into a philosophic
system and must necessarily be surrounded with a certain
amount of dignity. They must necessarily be protected by
contempt proceedings from too acrimonious criticism. A
court therefore cannot be a field of economic experimentation. Third, courts are not and should not be subject to
changing policies on account of popular demand. If they
announce an economic policy which does not fit they cannot change it under pressure of criticism without a certain
loss of dignity which is a necessary attribute of their judicial functions.
This is not so true of commissions as it is of courts. It
does not apply to legislatures at all. These bodies are and
should be responsive to popular demand and criticism.
They are pr6per bodies for economic experimentation as
such is needed. They may and do shift with every wave of
popular sentiment. If they are wrong, other commissions
or legislatures will not only correct them without hesitancy
but often will take an extreme pleasure in undoing what
their predecessors have done. Further than that, the legislative acts do not necessarily carry an implication that
further acts of the same character, extending the principles of the first act, will necessarily be passed. The condition of confused alarm as to what is going to happen in the
future does not exist in the minds of those who read a legislative act of which they disapprove.
To sum up, we do not deny that courts do, and at times
should, legislate. Many annoying and useless doctrines of
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the common law remain to plague us because courts have
refused to recognize changing conditions and have followed
judicial formula where a bold and sweeping change
amounting to judicial legislation would have been of the
utmost social benefit. We believe, nevertheless, that those
cases should be confined to that numerous class where
there is no substantial difference of opinion as to the social
desirability of a change. They should be cases where
reasonable men would not differ as to the necessity of a
new policy. When the courts, however, announce a new
policy not based- on previous custom and necessity, which
is, intended to mold the economic development of public
utilities and when the result is not one which is arrived at
by the construction of specific words in legislative enactment, or in determining whether a specific statute is unconstitutional or not, we believe that they have abandoned
the proper field, which is the construction of statutes and
the determination of private rights and have embarked on
a hazardous ventdre of economic experimentation.
In dealing with the acts of Public Utilities Commissions
we prefer the view that courts should give them as free a
hand as is possible under constitutional provisions. In the
absence of an appropriation of property without due process
of law, or mere arbitrary and capricious action on the part
of the Commission the court we believe should let its action
stand. The Commission is certainly a proper forum in which
economic and social arguments may be used. It is a fitting
instrument for economic experimentation. It should be let
alone so far as possible to investigate the economic principle involved in Mr. Hardman's thesis before this principle
is permanently established as part of the judicial law.
-T. W. ARNOLD.

CONTEMPT-EVASION OF CRIMINAL PROCESS AS CONTEMPT
OF COURT.-In a recent case1 the Supreme Court of Iowa deBurtch v. Zench, 200 Ia. 49, 202 N. W. 542, 39 A. L. R. 1349 (1025).
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